An Embrace of Influence

An Embrace of Influence


This essay seeks to explore the motivation for my work and the deliberate choice of working under the influence of others. It does this firstly by exploring an analysis of inspiration in literature and the avoidance of influence that many seek. I then explore what I am influenced by, first intentionally, namely that of the music of Steve Reich. This is then explored in relation to the ideas of structuralism and the visual arts. I then discuss the wider cultural influence that all humans are susceptible to, unwittingly and unavoidably. These ideas are then discussed in relation to my work itself.


In his book, The Anxiety of Influence (Bloom,1997 p. 6), Harold Bloom explores the influence of poets on one another. Most of this is from the perspective of not wanting to be influenced, or at least not wanting to be influenced in an overt manner, hence: the anxiety of influence. Bloom quotes the American modernist poet Wallace Stevens in saying ‘I am not conscious of having been influenced by anybody’ (p. 7), he goes on to say that he’s deliberately avoided reading other notable authors so as to avoid being influenced by them, consciously or otherwise. Bloom regards him as a failed poet for his inability to overcome this anxiety, and an anxiety that isn’t limited to poetry. Bloom writes within the confines of the poetic literary world, but his book is relevant further afield.


Bloom, wastes little time in getting to his point; ‘influence need not make poets less original; as often it makes them more original, though not therefore necessarily better.’ (p. 7) While poetic influence in itself is not the key to a quality poet, as poetry is not merely bricolage, a person well read in poetry will not necessarily have the ability to become a great poet. The influence of prior works upon the poet strengthens and alters succeeding works.


As the book is about poetry, written for other poets, and written by a poet, it itself is written poetically. Of course, this is fitting for Bloom, who says


‘Every poem is a misinterpretation of a parent poem. A poem is not an overcoming of anxiety, but is that anxiety. Poets’ misinterpretations or poems are more drastic than critics’ misinterpretations or criticism, but this is only a difference in degree and not at all in kind. There are no interpretations but only misinterpretations, and so all criticism is prose poetry’ (p. 95 - 96)


It’s logical then that Bloom’s discussion of the modes of influence that he identifies are explored through obfuscated poetic terms that require ‘misinterpretation’, as he puts it. These modes are what he calls the ‘six revisionary ratios.’ (p. 14 - 16) These methods or techniques explore the ways that one can embrace influence, to work with it and grow from it.


The first of these is the clinamen, which he describes as ‘poetic misreading or misprision proper’, or a ‘swerve’. (p. 14) This is a building upon the predecessor, with a correction to where the work ‘should’ have continued to.


Tessera, (p. 14) the second, is similar in that it builds upon works from a precursor, but instead of swerving away from their work, it holds a piece, or fracture of the work but develops it in another sense, as if to build from it and take it further than it was before.


The third ratio, kenosis, is a ‘move towards discontinuity with the influence’ (p. 14), this is a humbling of the self, a removal of ego. This is done in relation to the removal of the precursor’s ego through a similar re-evaluation of their poem - creating a contradiction of sorts, as a dialect.


Daemonization or a ‘movement to a personalised counter-sublime’ (p. 15) - here the poet reveals that their sublime elements are not wholly theirs, as they come to understand that their precursors’ sublime elements were too not entirely their imagining. This allows the work to be related to the previous to show that it was not so unique in itself.


Askesis, contrasts daemonization somewhat. Instead of revealing that the prior poet is not so unique, askesis reveals their uniqueness through the successor moving into a ‘state of solitude’ (p. 15) in a move to deliberately curtail their ability to remove the influence of the predecessor. This move exemplifies their unique qualities and limitations, while also revealing those of the predecessor.


The final ratio, Apophrades, is usually found later in a poet's life, when they return to influence so readily that one might almost think they are a novice, working with such influence so strongly as their own skills and abilities had begun to blossom. Instead of feeling hollow and appearing as a facsimile of the predecessor's work, or as if it were written by them, the work instead gives the impression that the poet had written the predecessor's work itself, as if it were ‘the return of the dead.’ (p. 15)


These ratios, as said before, are for poets. They’re designed for a specific task, to foster a poet’s ability to overcome the anxiety of influence. But there is no need to limit it in such a way. Furthermore, while they are intended to remove anxiety through revealing that influence is ever present and unavoidable, they can also serve as blueprints for inspiration. I myself struggle to work, not through an anxiety of influence, but an anxiety of decisiveness. For me, the six revisionary ratios can be taken not as the revelation of the destruction of solipsistic creativity, but as guidelines for new creativity. They function in this way as a removal of the writer’s chock, enabling their wheels to turn once again as they move forward to let ideas take flight. Thus, an artist who is ‘stuck’, can choose influence, not simply become comfortable with it and move past it, but deliberately search for it, then grow and change with it using the ratios as a starting framework. Some of them are more obtuse than others, and everyone won’t have the skill, ability, experience or desire to utilise all six, but as a starting point, it reveals the depth of influence that a source can have.



This was my methodology, rather than seek out people to work with, I initially chose to work ‘from’ something and ‘swerve’ away from it into a new direction. What to choose? Something too close to myself or my practice would stifle me, then an anxiety of influence would set in, were it influence or copying?



Further afield, I studied musicians. While not a musician myself, I am constantly lost in sounds and music. I find it easier to find notes of influence, motifs, quotations in music. I began exploring this as a way to begin to find traces of influence through or across cultures. When we recognise a style as belonging to or originating with one culture, for example jazz, we can identify a transmission of ideas when we find it elsewhere. Blue Nippon: Authenticating Jazz in Japan, does this for jazz in Japan. The book tracks the origins and developments while assessing the authenticity and perceptions of jazz in an alien culture (Atkins, 2001). In doing so it reveals not just an unknown history and shows you that your preconceived notions of culture are incorrect. Influence is everywhere, unexpected and legitimate. Sound Unbound, (Miller, 2008) a reader edited by Paul D. Miller, himself a DJ known as ‘DJ Spooky that Subliminal Kid’ features contributions from a wide variety of other DJs, composers and musicians and performers. It in some ways fulfils the same goals as Blue Nippon, but it’s focused on contemporary digital culture and sampling instead of music within a culture. The book has interviews and writings with many different areas of focus, some are about a person and their work, some explore the origins of hip-hop. Within this book I also discovered Steve Reich. Reich quickly became of interest to me. While his work was as adventurous and important as other composers like Schoenberg, Boulez or Cage, it felt more human. The other composers' works are bound in theory, but feel inaccessible without this knowledge. The theoretical backing of the work isn’t audibly discernable to those who don’t know musical theory in depth, and sometimes even to those who do. Reich however, while not immediately understandable, felt human, attainable, and non-theoretically focused.


Reich has had a long career, usually writing ensemble pieces for various arrangements of instruments, sometimes accompanied by tape recorders. Sound Unbound is largely concerned with his early pure tape sampling work such as It’s Gonna Rain, Pt.I & Pt. II (Reich, 1989), which make use of duplicated recordings on tapes played over each other at slightly varying speeds so that they phase in and out of time with each other and create an entirely new audio experience than the original tape provides. Reich also composes pieces in this vein for human players, such as Piano Phase (Reich, 1989), Violin Phase (Reich, 1980) and Clapping Music (Reich, 1989), as well as others. This is where my attention was really grabbed. Piano Phase has an ethereal rhythmic and melodic quality to it. It’s minimalism at its finest, new rhythms and melodies appear and disappear as the players move in and out of phase freely, gradually and seemingly effortlessly. Clapping Music uses the same concept of ‘phasing’, but is more rigidly applied to a bar structure. Two players clap the same rhythm at the same time, and every twelve repetitions one of them shifts their rhythm one quaver forward and continues clapping at the same speed. This continues until it returns back to being in synchronisation. This abrupt phasing creates new polyrhythms every twelve repetitions, changing entirely how the clapping sounds. Some are pleasing, some feel much more messy, some overlap in ways that reduce the empty space between claps, others accentuate it. These phases completely captivated me. It’s such a simple idea that completely changes the way something is considered.


This quality to me was something hugely intriguing, and something to ‘swerve’ away from and develop and explore in my own style and through my own medium. Reich uses the idea of phasing as a ‘process’ to work within and compose his music around. Although it could equally be called a system, or structure. In his essay ‘Music as a Gradual Process’ (Reich, 2002 p. 34) he explains his rationale and the reasons for his chosen process as such: ‘I am interested in perceptible processes. I want to be able to hear the process happening throughout the sounding music.’ (p. 34) This contrasts John Cage, who he mentions by name, saying that Cage might use the I Ching (an ancient Chinese divination text), or the imperfections in a sheet of paper to aid in composing music. While Reich doesn’t question the validity of these methods, he feels that they become a sort of secret known only to the composer, simply a hidden tool that results in music that can be heard and performed. Reich instead values the process and the music as one thing, ‘what I’m interested in is a compositional process and a sounding music that are one and the same thing.’ (p. 35) Reich likens processes and music being experienced this way to watching a swing come to rest, the sand fall through an hourglass, or the waves bury your feet in the sand. (p. 34) These gradual experiences are what he aims to replicate, the promotion of an experience, something that can be understood when you spend time with it, like watching the minute hand on a watch.

 

These themes can and do carry across well to visual art, while words are sticky and spiky, terms like ‘structuralism’, that I’ll go into more later, ‘serialism’, ‘process’, ‘instructional’, or several others, might be adopted or rejected by any person or group for the same or similar things. Many parallels can be drawn between practitioners in each field. Reich rejects the term serialism and even says that it has given him something to ‘push against.’ (p. 159) Contrasting this in the visual arts world with Sol LeWitt, to whom the term is applied often. However when investigating their work, one can find similarities. LeWitt starts with a simple form and uses a set of rules to determine the overall composition of a piece. This is not unlike Reich, who begins with a simple musical phrase, then uses phasing to determine the sound of a piece. They too both speak similarly of their processes. Reich says ‘once the process is set up and loaded it runs by itself’ (p. 34), which is not too unlike LeWitt’s proclamation that ‘The idea becomes a machine that makes the art.’ (LeWitt p. 1)


LeWitt’s piece ‘Incomplete Open Cubes’ (LeWitt 1974/1982) is a perfect comparison to ‘Clapping Music’ or ‘Piano Phase’ by Reich. It is a serialist work based on the form of an open cube. The work simply shows all the ways that the cube can be incomplete, from three simple lines forming a corner that you extrapolate into a cube of a certain size, all the way up to a cube with only one edge missing. The resulting work shows all 122 variations, accounting for the fact that rotations are excluded. The point however, is not the cubes themselves, much like in Reich’s work that shows the notes chosen aren’t what the music is about. The incomplete open cubes are about how you look at them. When seen initially, the work looks messy. The cubes aren’t isolated to be viewed individually, but displayed as a whole, on a low plinth with grid lines on it, each incomplete cube occupying its own cell, but close enough to each neighbour that they overlap visually. This creates at first what looks like a mess. As you move around it, the way the lines overlap changes, and while you might know the work, the concept and the arrangement, in each moment that you look at it you might not be quite able to make out a particular model. In a video from SF MOMA LeWitt says “The idea part is simple, but the visual perception is complex” (SF MOMA, 2013). He describes the initial impression of the work as chaos, but then as something that becomes orderly when looked at from specific places. It’s not a work that exhibits itself to you simply, but has to be examined or ‘untangled’ as Gary Garrels says in the same video.


This strikes me as similar to Reich’s work. As we move around the incomplete open cubes we can view them from different angles, in a similar way, Reich implements phasing to change our perception of the music. It is the music that moves around us instead of us that moves around the physical work. However, the outcome is similar, we gain a new understanding of the work and can explore it from a new position. The only difference is whether it is using our ears or our eyes.


Of course LeWitt isn’t the only artist to work in such systems in the realm of visual arts, and while his work is systemic, it feels much more rigid than Reich’s music. When compared to another artist, such as Hans Haacke, we can see fluidity and changeability in the artwork itself, rather than simply relying on the viewer to move around it and change their perception. Haacke creates artworks that again use systems, but of a different type. Rather than create an artwork that is based on a mathematical solution such as LeWitt’s work, Haack creates a miniature system itself, that can then run, free from interaction and be viewed as a process that runs by itself, in much the same way that Reich thinks of his music. ‘Blue Sail’ (Haacke, 1964-1965) is a perfect example of this. A blue piece of chiffon is hung horizontally above the ground, weighted in each corner, with an oscillating fan beneath it, pointing up. The fan slowly moves back and forth, as oscillating fans do. The fan simply blows air up to change the shape of the chiffon, a simple process of interaction between objects and the air. This serves as a visualisation of air currents, material properties and becomes something to simply look at and think about. The form is governed by the materials chosen and the power of the fan, rather than be constrained into a specific shape by the artist. This isn’t to say choices haven’t been made, of course they have, but they allow the system to show the material properties and their interaction.


In one of Haack’s other pieces, Condensation Cube (Haacke, 1965), the system is even more contained, but also much more gradual because of this. The work is simply a sealed plexiglass cube with a small amount of water at the bottom. Some of the water evaporates and then condenses on the inside walls of the cube, eventually forming larger droplets that roll down and back into the water, before ultimately cycling again. Of course this is an apparently closed loop, but only to the immediate viewer. If placed in the sun, the work will change more rapidly than in an air conditioned gallery space because the temperature differential will be higher. Of course, unlike Blue Sail, this work requires no electricity. It can simply be placed somewhere and run, or moved to a new place and continue to run, possibly slightly differently depending on its new environment. This work feels more like the ‘gradual process’ that Reich aims for when compared to Blue Sail, with a loud oscillating fan and a large blue chiffon sheet that responds obviously and immediately to the air currents sent its way, with a largely predictable pattern of movement repeating quite quickly. There is subtlety here, but it’s overpowered by rapid movements and noise. The Condensation Cube does not have the problem. It will look slightly different every time you see it, and change subtly and slowly as you look at it. It requires you to spend time with it, to see it move and to appreciate it.


It’s simple to see how the ideas of structuralism, or a focus on relationships between the elements in a system, can be applied to the visual arts in these ways, and how one can be influenced by it in their own practice as I have. However, influence is not solitary. It’s not a binary switch that can be chosen or ignored. Bloom‘s quote from Stevens where he says he’s not conscious of being influenced by anyone, that was discussed earlier, sticks out here. (Bloom, 1997 p. 7) Stevens might have avoided reading other poets, that is true, but he didn’t exist in isolation. To be devoid of influence one would have to exist in a void, to exist in culture is to be influenced. Victor Shklovsky explored similar ideas in the 1920s in his book ‘Theory of Prose.’ (Shklovsky 1991) Shklovsky was ahead of the curve in many ways, explaining what would be advanced later by Bloom and Saussere. Shklovsky re-states ‘art is thinking in images’, from Potebnya. (p. 1) He goes on to say that poetry is thinking in images, while his focus here is largely on the meaning and interpretation of the images themselves, and how they relate to the poetry and our understanding of them, he does consider the origin of the images also.


Shklovsky states that art is thinking in images, and that images are the distinguishing feature of poetry, so people must expect that poetry consists in changes in the history of the image, however in actual fact the images endure and last. (p. 2) ‘It turns out, however, that images endure and last. From century to century, from country to country, from poet to poet, these images march on without change.’ (p. 2) The images move from person to person, therefore belong, not to anyone in particular, except as Shklovsky suggests, maybe ‘to God.’ (p. 2) Like the apophrades that Bloom discussed, (Bloom, 1997 p. 15), the return of the dead creates a blurring between the influenced and influencer. Shklovsky points out similarly, that ‘the images you thought were created by a given poet were, in reality, passed on to him by others with hardly a change.’ This results in schools of poetry where the artists ‘recollect’ images rather than ‘thinking’ in them, essentially accumulating and reordering arrangements. Poetry is in this way, not wholly original to each poet, but an accumulation and reordering of things drawn from previous poets.


Roland Barthes explores this transference of images in his book Mythologies. Expanding on the idea that ideas are bigger than a person and are rather accumulated through time. Rather than through the transference of images in poetry or art, he explores the ways in which the world around us influences us as ordinary people, and how our perception of things changes because of the environment that we exist in and have been raised in. In one chapter, Toys, (Barthes, 1991 p. 53) Barthes explores the toys that children use and how this conveys the French perspective on children at the time that it was written, as well as how these toys might mould children into a specific way of thinking for the rest of their lives.


Childrens’ toys, as Barthes points out, are rarely invented forms, an exception being blocks, which offer an abstract play experience. The majority however are miniaturised copies of objects that reflect the commonalities of life that adults experience, as if a child were just a shrunken down person needing things made for their scale. (p. 53) Barthes’ analysis is that the toys mean something. They don’t offer an outlet for imagination, rather an avenue for roleplay, which serves only to prepare themselves for adult life, and to encourage an acceptance from a young age. He uses the example of a doll, reinforcing the idea upon a young girl to be ready for a life as a mother. This isn’t gender limited, the army, post office, medicine, school, hair styling, and transport are all other examples that he offers in less detail. These too all prepare children with prepackaged ideas of adult life. They offer a one way path, rarely able to be interpreted.


If presented with one of these prepackaged conventions, there becomes a right and a wrong way to play. A children’s kitchen is only a kitchen, a toy train should stay on the tracks, even toy letters need to be delivered, and inanimate sick ‘patients’ require the right sort of attention. ‘The child can only identify himself as owner, as user, never as creator; he does not invent the world, he uses it’. (p. 54) Barthes shows that adult life isn’t invented by children, just present to them readymade. Contrasting this with blocks, one of the simplest toys, allows for far more creativity. To use blocks is to be creative, each is only a simple 3D shape. Rather than a prescribed activity with each toy or action, they become a blank canvas for any action or activity, helping to create creators, rather than users (p. 54). Lego is the obvious example for this. Simple shapes, modified to allow them to fit together, a variety of colours, and endless possibilities. Lego has even touched on this in their own marketing, with a note to parents included in 70s advertising encouraging parents to let children build whatever fits them creatively, rather than conform to gender stereotypes (Indy100, 2014).


While Barthes’ discussion of toys feels relevant and largely true today, his discussion of plastics does not. He begins by saying they have ‘names of Greek shepherds’ (Barthes, 1991 p. 97), a joke based on the poly- prefix that many plastics share, which sounds somewhat like a name such as Polyphemus, one of the Cyclopes from the Odyssey. This already elevates plastics to something known by those of a more educated stature, equating things to classical poetry is hardly ever an insult. He further praises plastic by calling it ‘the stuff of alchemy’ (p. 97). Plastic is manufactured gold, or the universal elixir.


Today, this reads as an outdated and regrettable opinion, but that’s precisely the point. ‘More than a substance, plastic is the very idea of its infinite transformation … it is this, in fact, which makes it a miraculous substance’ (p. 97). In Barthes' time, plastic is the new wonder material, like asbestos was before it. I’m sure he would have not been so positive about that, much like people today are not positive about plastic. Both of these materials are not better or worse at any given time, instead we understand them differently and we talk about them differently. When we compare Barthes' writing of plastic to today, there’s essentially nothing different about the use of plastic at the time, ‘it can become buckets as well as jewels.’ (p. 97) However the following line ‘Hence a perpetual amazement...’, reveals the difference of opinion to a contemporary reader. He says ‘the hierarchy of substances is abolished: a single one replaces them all: the whole world can be plasticized [sic]’, (p. 99) today we understand that the whole world is being plasticised, and that it isn’t an alchemical wonder material, but a catastrophe. But plastic hasn’t changed, only the attitudes around it. Whenever we see plastic talked about today it’s in a rather different context ‘Plastic pollution: take-out food is littering the oceans’ (BBC, 2021), the title of one of countless articles about plastic that we now see regularly.



This line of thinking doesn’t originate with Barthes, I only approach it from that angle as it feels more easily understood. It is actually a development of structuralism in linguistics by Ferdinand de Saussure. Saussure developed thinking on language focusing not on how the language has changed and developed from other languages, but as a cultural element that is changed by a society. This presents language as a structure that changes the collective consciousness of the society, and therefore moulds each and every person that is born into that society, or language structure. (Blumenau, 2002 p. 888) Extremely simply, structuralism suggests that words are the thing we see or hear, the signifier, the concept that is evoked, or signified. Sign is used as shorthand which combines these two terms. There is finally the denotation, the actual thing that is being signified, which remains the same even if the signifier is changed. So the word ‘chair’ is the signifier, the idea of a chair is the signified, and an actual chair is the denotation. (p. 889)


While initially focused on linguistics, it’s not hard to see how this was modified into other areas, and broader ways of thinking, such as in Barthes’ work. Saussure himself developed semiotics, a broader study of signs rather than language and words by taking the structure of structuralism and applying the idea of signifiers and signified to other things. Facial expressions can be thought of in this structure. The facial expression is seen as a word is seen, as the signifier, we register the meaning as we do a word, and so it is signified, and the expression itself is the denotation. (p. 890) There is an extra layer here however, that of connotations. Connotations are the additional meanings that are additional and more changeable or even contextual (p. 889). It is these connotations that form the basis for Barthes' discussion of mythologies.


And so, circling back to Stevens’ denial of influence from anybody for a second time, it strikes as particularly hollow when we consider both structuralism and Barthes’ mythologies. Any mention of any number of things that he might have made becomes coloured by his era. As unpoetic as it might seem today, if we return to plastic for a moment, were Stevens to summon an image of it in one of his poems, would he call forth a brightly coloured wonder material that can fill every niche, or a slick, greasy looking ever present nuisance that’s ruining the planet? In the same way, when I create work, I’m not only influenced by those artists and ideas that I choose to work in relation to, but also my culture, upbringing, interests, and the world around me. In this sense, I pull from two paths, the known, and the unknown, the influence of an artist, and my own mythologies.


I’ve already discussed that I’m influenced by Steve Reich. This is deliberate, known and obvious. The mythologies that show in my work are initially somewhat harder to see, at least for me. They are often so close to us that we fail to see even our own, sometimes only becoming obvious after work has been completed, or shown to us by others with an outside perspective. Of the two influences I’ll discuss here, both only became apparent after the work was partway through, and one was meant to be avoided entirely.


The first of these mythologies, and the avoidance that was intended was that of the digital world. As a person born in the early nineteen nineties, technology in general, computers and the internet has been a huge part of my life. Encouraged by my mother, I adopted these new technologies from a young age, I was shown videogames and learned to use computer programmes rapidly. It’s not to say that I didn’t have physical toys, such as lego sets, however I was endlessly fascinated by the home computer, and some of my strongest memories are of my early interactions with the few 90s computer games that I had access to. Rodent’s Revenge (Microsoft 1991) was the first of these, a now largely forgotten classic that was already old by the time that I got to it. It’s an unattractive greenish brown game where you play as a grey mouse who has to trap cats by sliding blocks around to close them off before being caught. Simple, effective, and fun. Minesweeper (Microsoft, a 1998) too, still well known to this day, took some getting used to as I  impatiently clicked around without paying much attention to the numbers. I still remember my satisfaction when I finished a game for the first time. There were avoided games too, Solitaire (Microsoft, b 1998) was, and still is, a boring game. Though worst of all was Mavis Beacon Teaches Typing (The Software Toolworks, 1987), a programme with good intentions that was avoided, completely, in favour of other things. Mostly for the final game that I wish to mention here: Microsoft Flight Simulator 98 (Microsoft, 1997). To me, as a child, this was incomparable, while it’s a complex game, it’s easy enough to understand as there’s little abstraction. Just planes to learn, and an open sky to fly around in. So it’s easy to understand how I spent many hours learning how to take off in each of my preferred planes, to fly around cities, under bridges and between buildings.


This is the sort of toy that Barthes wouldn’t have imagined in his comparison between miniature facsimiles of everyday objects and a set of wooden blocks, and the advantages of the latter over the former in creating a creator, rather than a user. However, to me, it’s clear to see that this handful of digital ‘toys’ have sent me down a path as a digital native, eager to explore as much as I could get my hands on, until today, where I still play Microsoft Flight Simulator, though the 2020 version (Asobo Studio 2020), and have embraced digital technologies in many aspects of my life. In the same way, as I grew as a creative, this was an obvious avenue of exploration. Modern applications are now much more advanced than early MS Paint was, and so they became useful tools in wholly or partially creating many of my projects. Initially I was using digital processes in my work for this project, but after using it so much over the prior years, I felt completely oversaturated with it, and abandoned digital processes completely for the project. It was surprising to me, then, to be told my work looked digital, not digitally made, but comparable visually to early computer art in ways that I’ll discuss later. It was however, a surprise to me that even as I tried to avoid computers, my passion for them, and overuse of them, shows through in my work regardless.


The second mythology that shows through my work is more complicated. This is that of Japanese art, itself an unwieldy and broad term encompassing several centuries and genres. While I didn’t intend to directly reference this, it’s an area that I’m interested in, and have deliberately tried to implement attitudes from it into my practice over the last couple of years. The complication arises from the fact that this is essentially a misunderstood interest. From a western perspective, I’ve largely been interested in woodblock prints, often referred to as ukiyo-e, which is itself a genre that many prints and paintings occupy. Japanese woodblock prints, or mokuhanga, are of course bigger than one genre. From a western perspective, these prints would occupy the same status as paintings. To be treasured and appreciated, regarded highly, hoarded and hopefully exhibited for people to see. Imagine my surprise then, when upon visiting Japan for the first time, I found in museums and galleries not woodblock prints, but ceramics, swords and sumi. Instead, the prints that were to the west, apparently the most important part of Japanese art, were limited to a few independent shops and galleries, largely forgotten or ignored. The Ōta Memorial Museum of Art is, as it says on its own website, ‘one of the few museums specializing (sic) in ukiyo-e’ (Ōta Memorial Museum of Art, n.d.) and that ukiyo-e is admired abroad as a traditional art of Japan. Rather than analysing the minutiae of Japanese aesthetics, it’s simpler to say that although they fit many elements of Japanese aesthetics, the reproducibility of the printing process means that prints lack the unique, ephemeral qualities that are regarded most highly, thereby often relegating them to objects of function, such as illustrated book pages.


Predictably then, in reading about Japanese aesthetics prints do not appear much, if at all. Though the insights written about the wider field can certainly be applied. It’s this element of understanding over simple appreciation that has begun to influence my work. In Praise of Shadows by Jun’ichirō Tanizaki focuses on the atmosphere around things rather than the things themselves. He explores how we experience things in relation to light, or the lack of it. The book is a discussion, largely lamenting the lost ways of the Japanese style when confronted with a modern world full of white appliances and electric lighting. This is something I had not understood at all until reading the book. I’d always found the Japanese style of lacquerware with gold flecks in it to be ostentatious and struggled to relate it to the simplicity and minimalism that Japan is known for. Tanizaki explains


‘Lacquerware decorated in gold is not something to be seen in a brilliant light, to be taken in at a single glance; it should be left in the dark, a part here and a part there picked up by a faint light.’ (Tanizaki, 2001 p. 24)


In the same way he likens a room to an ink wash painting and the essential nature of the shadows within it, enabling mystery and secrets in shadows, instead of soulless electric lighting  (p. 32). This attitude to light and material goes as far as to something as mundane as paper ‘Western paper turns away the light, while ours seems to take it in’ (p. 17). This paper gives a feeling of warmth, he says, it feels natural, human and something of worth, when taken in comparison to western paper that is just something to be used.


Kenya Hara explores the inverse of this in his book White from the perspective of a graphic designer. He positions his work opposite Tanizaki, who works from the standpoint of shadow. Hara posits the contrast of this, a vanishing point not of darkness, but of extreme brightness (Hara, 2010 p. 3). In the same way that Tanizaki compares the shadows of a room to the shades in an ink painting with depth and mystery, Hara compares the different hues of white papers, each with a subtle difference in whiteness and texture. Each paper says something different and plays a role in our experience of a book. (p. 21) Hara says that of natural colours white is the one with the most impact, leading him away from artificial colours entirely. Against these natural colours seen in other papers, cardboard, rust, sand and seeds, white leaves the greatest mark (p. 20)


It’s in thinking about my influences in relation to these mythologies that I begin to see my work as a realisation of more than just its intention. It’s built on the influence of Reich and his ideas in music; of phasing, and repetition. But it became a representation of analogue digitalism, vectors of blackness on whiteness, to be looked at in natural light through an adjacent window, to see texture, shadow, shape, and the shallow depth of paper. As it was made, the work was malformed by my modern digital surroundings, my incorrect assumptions and half learned appropriations - this isn’t negative, but the reality of the human experience, we’re all coloured by our experience.


Returning, for a second, to Bloom’s ratios and the ‘swerve’ that I had initially intended. It should now be reconsidered. The more I worked, the more I moved away from what I started with. It’s here that the six revisionary ratios become ambiguous to me. Have I swerved too much to consider it a swerve? Am I instead now left with only a fragment of my initial inspiration, a ‘tessera’, that I have built upon and developed in a new way? It is possible that this fits better now, looking back. Similarly, is my rejection of digital media a ‘kenosis’: ‘a move towards discontinuity with the influence’? (Bloom, 1997 p. 14) Likewise, this whole project feels like an exercise in ‘daemonization’, essentially realising that everyone borrows from their predecessors and society at large. It’s here that Bloom’s ratios become ambiguous. They reveal themselves as idealised; influence can’t fit into six neat methods, it’s too complicated and messy. They work as a foundation for understanding this, but not much more.


The work itself is simple, hand-cut stamps of simple shapes, pressed in dark oil based ink and then hand pressed into a variety of paper types, and presented on another larger roll of white paper. The ‘phasing’ idea taken from Reich was initially implemented as a visual phasing of shapes, digitally, then as digital mockups of a physical piece. It felt obvious and lazily copied. There was no ‘swerve’ to originality there. This is what drove my abandonment of digital media, seeking a new ground to explore in rather than cycling around the same techniques and programs. This began in the same way, a repetition of a shape over itself, to change the perception of the shape, this was successful, but limiting visually. Music is not one ‘shape’. Each note is different, and each instrument or player adds tone colours and subtle interpretations. To mimic this I developed the work by exploring differing shapes in combination with each other, not so much simply phasing now, but developing micro compositions from a series of base elements, exploring each in relation to another or itself, showing how meaning is not defined by the self, but the surroundings too. From here the structure developed: a set selection of papers, an ink pad, and a selection of shapes.


The paper quickly became as much of a key component as the ink and the shapes that it formed. Western and eastern varieties were used, each highlighting not necessarily an influence from a school of thought, but rather a unique whiteness and texture. The ink forms crisp lines on some of the paper and feathers on others. Some appear flat, others cast minute shadows upon themselves and reveal their texture in a raking light. This appreciation of paper and its interaction with the ink adds a curious quality to the work; the same impressions printed digitally would appear perfect, but to a fault. They become sterile, lifeless, brightly lit, free from any shadows.


The shapes themselves are meaningless, but when seen in different arrangements they begin to form signs, some recall the digital imagery that has influenced me greatly as mentioned before, while others speak to the prior experiences of the viewer. A bird, cookies, mother and child, a cell, a triskelion, a tin of sardines; all things that I or others see when looking at the work. This aspect begins to approach semiotics and the study of signs and symbols that Ferdinand de Saussure developed. What might people who are entirely removed from my culture see? The work shows that taking an idea, in this case that of phasing from Reich, out of one world and into my own small corner of visual arts shows the extent to which recontextualisation is a powerful tool, at both a micro and macro level. Influence is shown not only as a deliberate thing that should be embraced and utilised, but also as an unavoidable byproduct of existing in a society as we all do. There is no need for an anxiety of influence, rather, an embrace.


Bibliography

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[ ]

[ ]

or

The Name is the Gathering of the Thingness to the Thing

Introduction

“A dull name can mean a dull child.” (Train, 1977, p. 11) John Train argues in his book Remarkable Names of Real People. The book is a witty, small work that largely comprises of a list of funny names. The book presents itself as an absurdist joke. The author’s own unique name coupled with the absurdist humour such as the acknowledgments beginning “The Office of Nomenclature Stabilization is grateful to its many faithful correspondents...” (p.5) certainly give the book an unbelievable quality. Of course the book tells you that it is real, but when thumbing through the pages and reading names featured such as “Sir Basil Smallpeice” (p. 19) “Cardinal Sin” (p. 23) or “Major Minor” (p. 43) it certainly looks like a badly constructed joke book with a strong theme. Some are however, verifiable, Cardinal Jaime Sin was the head of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and died in 2005 (The Guardian, 2005). This pang of reality changes the book. Yes, it is absurd, but it’s a small mirror onto an absurdist aspect of reality that is often overlooked. Can the name of a child change the way that the child will live their life, how others will see them and what opportunities they will gain or lose out on? “If you call your little one Elmer he is less likely to amount to anything than if you plunge in with a Charlemagne or Napoleon” (Train, 1977, p. 11). As someone with an ‘interesting’ name, that is, one whose name is its own short sentence; “Will Mark Treasure”, I have found it to be more memorable to others, even if they simply laugh at the surname I bear. To be given a curious name is more a blessing than a curse in my case, it serves as an icebreaker on occasion, a harmless joke, a softener, or a funny name puts people at ease. I’m sure John Train encountered this himself, we have odd names in common, although as an investment advisor he might rather have my name, and as a train enthusiast I might rather his. It’s not all we have in common, of course, the other is our interest in names. Has our interest in names come about from others interest in our own names? Has our interesting names made us interesting people? Train’s focus is on wit and the names that people bear, whereas my interest extends from just people. If “a dull name can mean a dull child” (p. 11), then can “a dull name can mean a dull thing” also be true?

This is the essence of my dissertation, to seek to determine if the name that we give to a thing can change how we perceive it, and if so, to what extent. I will discuss this over four chapters. The first chapter will discuss names in the context of common use. This explores encounterable names, how we might consider things based on the names that they have, and begins to explore what can happen if a name is removed or altered. The second chapter approaches names as memes, seeking to examine why they are so prolific and unavoidable. The third chapter explores the name of a particular object, the jug, in relation to Heidegger’s writings. Heidegger is focused on understanding the jug as a thing, and things in general. This chapter focuses instead on the way that the word ‘jug’ is more of a hindrance than a help in understanding the nature of objects. The final chapter explores the implications of naming through the lens of  a propositional object as a thought experiment. This object intends to show the variability of names that forms can receive, and the breadth of changeable outcomes that this can produce.

Chapter 1

The Name

In many ways, names are a tool, a simple means to an end. In modern language they form an invaluable part of our method of communicating. It’s easy enough to point to a ‘thing’ to communicate subject, but it’s obvious that calling something by a shared word, a name, enables a more streamlined communication to take place, one that doesn’t require every object one might discuss to be present. This is evident in the scientific community, where animals share names across languages for clarity. In biology, each animal can have many names, usually a different one in each language, however for ease of communication each also has a scientific name, usually in Latin or Greek. Instead of requiring a whole common language, names for animals use a common system in languages that nobody speaks anymore, enabling people to collaboratively organise genus, family and species without confusion. These names are not isolated to science, as Michael Ohl quickly refutes, citing children's books and the knowledge of dinosaur names in the introduction to his book ‘The Art of Naming’ (Ohl, 2018 p. viii). Ohl discusses the importance of these names, and the effect that they have on us when we learn them and use them. “For those who know its name, it becomes possible to experience and possess Spinosaurus, that fearsome predator of the Cretaceous Period.” (p. viii) For Ohl, the scientific name isn’t just a tool, but a connection to both everyone else who uses the name and to the animal itself. Ohl thinks of the knowledge of names almost like a passcode to a secret club, to know the name is to be ‘in on it’.

Ohl discusses the implications of names on animals when used in common language, as of course we rarely use an animal’s scientific name in colloquial conversation. Each language has their own terminologies that they use for ease in place of Latin names. In German, the equivalent name for shrew is spitzmaus and instead of bat they use fledermaus. In 1942 these were to be changed simply to spitzer and fleder in a decision made by the German Society of Mammalogy (p. 1). This decision was overturned in a strongly worded letter by the head of the government at the time. The reason that the names were to be changed lies in the scientific inaccuracy of the originals, as spitzmaus and fledermaus translate loosely as pointed mouse and flutter mouse respectively, when in fact neither a shrew or a bat are in the same family as the mouse. Aside from the accuracy required from naming of animals, Ohl explains another reason for the desire to change the nomenclature. Biologist Hermann Pohle was one of the first to argue to change the names for shrews and bats because uniquely spitzmaus and fledermaus are also in the common German vernacular. This means that as both have the base of their word, the latter part in German, be maus, then people will associate them with mice, and treat them as such. Of course mice are pests, they live in houses and steal food, leaving only mess. Shrews and bats are harmless to humans, and it was Pohle’s desire to see attitudes towards them change after changing their name (p. 13). Of course due to the intervention of the government at the time the names were not changed, and remain inaccurate, and possibly detrimental to the perception of the animals.

The issue of the fledermaus and the spitzmaus being identified as mice because they are called as such is relevant not just in biological terms but everywhere. Names can often be our first point of contact with things. Ernst van de Wetering discusses the surface of objects and their importance is his essay on object surfaces and museum style (van de Wetering, 2012). Surfaces are usually our first actual point of contact with an object. It’s often the first thing we see or touch. Van de Wetering laments that the surface of things is often seen as superficial. Objects are criticised for having a veneer, either literally or figuratively, and people are called ‘shallow’ whereas people with ‘depth’ are more desirable. He comments on the perception that if the surface of objects is emphasised then the objects are often regarded as being deceiving or ‘glitter rather than gold’ (p. 103). He then quotes Hanna Jedrzejewska when she concluded in a paper that “The most important and the most representative part of an object is its surface” (p. 103) and says he was immediately captured by the statement upon hearing it at a seminar. Of course his essay is on museum objects, where glass, guards and alarms prevent objects from being touched. The surface is then all most of us will ever know of an object in a museum, as van de Wetering points out, it is too the part of an object that holds the finishing or finest craftsmanship that was used to make it. It is the surface that holds the detail that is most readily available to us. Similarly, names are the surface of our encounter with things. We often encounter things without knowing their names, but so too do we often know the names of things, animals, or people, without encountering their surfaces. Van de Wetering says he was overwhelmed at the sheer quantity of object surface there are when he first considered it with intent. He likens the intensive experience of each one to a potential “near psychedelic experience”, but that instead of investigating details of objects, we use only a little of their details, making assumptions or drawing on past experiences to extrapolate the qualities of the surface of any given object (p. 103.). Van de Wetering then shares his own example of a case where he assumed the surface of an object based on his past experience. When visiting France as a teenager he kicked a metal ball, assuming it was rubber, having never heard of boules (p. 104). The ball would not have been kicked had van de Wetering examined its surface, but it also probably wouldn’t have happened if, as he admits, he knew the name. In the same way that he assumed it being a ball would mean it was kickable, he would have assumed it was not had he known the object’s name.

In the same way that by seeing elements of an object's surface we make assumptions on the rest of the object, we also make assumptions based on the name, and in the same way that Van de Wetering was in awe at the quantity of object surfaces, we too can be amazed at the sheer quantity of names for things, even only within our own language. When approached in this way, the ball was assumed to be kickable because of both the assumed name, and assumed surface, when knowing the actual name or surface would have shown it not to be. Similarly, the fledermaus and spitzmaus might be assumed to be mice without ever seeing either animal, due to their names. Perhaps the name is as important to our perception of the thing as the surface is. We might experience either first in isolation, or in parallel to each other, as an object surface and with the name as a para-surface. Calling names a para-surface highlights their importance in this way. There are many, many things we will not know the surfaces of, wild animals, dinosaurs, countless plants, let alone anything not on this planet. But by naming them, as we name all things, we develop assumptions about them and relate them to things that we do know. I assume that I know how the rocks on Mars feel because we call them rocks. I feel that I know what a Martian rock is like based simply on the para-surface I know, regardless of how accurate my assumption is. We do not rely on the surface of objects, we utilise the para-surface to allow ourselves to focus on other things, the para-surface enables us to avoid being overwhelmed in the way that van de Wetering was at his exploration of object surfaces. Life would be far too slow if each time we saw an object we were to break down in great detail the surface of it, we learn by touch, sight and smell what each surface is like, then assume similar looking surfaces share these properties. Then we apply a name to each surface so that we can know with more immediacy what it will be like, we hope.

To further highlight the importance of a name Simon Knell removes the name of an object that forms the backbone for one of his key discussions. His essay isn’t about naming, not directly, but he uses the absence of the object’s name to illustrate his point. He begins his essay by discussing the ‘reading’ of an object, saying that while people have believed to read meanings from objects, he contests that they were really “trying out what fits” and “infusing it with their thoughts and desires” (Knell, 2012, p. 324). Knell writes in the context of art objects, which are unique in that they are often abstractly or uniquely named, or deliberately unnamed, things. Art objects are also objects that would not be encountered in many environments, so seem more open to interpretation than non-art objects do. Knell argues that it is this interpretation that makes an art object. A material object cannot also be an art object, or become one, without interpretation being applied to it (p. 325). He then goes into great detail discussing objects, but he omits the name of the objects saying “If I state overtly what they are, you will be inclined to presume to know the arcane world to which they belong” (p. 330). Is the removal of the name not the removal of interpretation? He claims that the interpretation makes an object an art object, but I think it’s more reasonable to argue that the interpretation is not applied to art objects to make them art objects, but that they are open to interpretation. The reinterpretation of a named object is often closed. It has been decided, and new interpretations are incorrect. Knell removes the name of a non-art object to allow the reader to fully consider his words about the object without knowing what it is and relying on the ‘actuality’ of the object.

Knell discusses this quality of objects earlier in the essay when he describes the duality of our experience of material objects, the intangible qualities of the object seem to us, inseparable from the tangible, and that we perceive each object as one whole object. However, when we perceive an object, Knell argues that we actually experience two, one that exists only in our mind, and is the result of our experience of the object. This is unavoidable, but never exists in the physical world. The other object is the material object itself, which will never exist in our thoughts, as we are clouded by our own perception. The name of an object is part of this, an intangible element that pervades our perception and becomes an inseparable part of the object within our consciousness, but never exists within the object itself (p. 326). As Knell acknowledges, some people would argue that “A bowl is made a bowl and does not become one simply through use” (p. 325). However surely the bowl has been interpreted as a bowl, potentially through the act of making it, yes, but regardless, it itself is not a ‘bowl’, it only exists as a bowl in the mind of those that perceive it as such. The distinction here is that the object is common enough that the interpretation of the object is at a pan cultural level rather than at a individual level.

By removing the name, Knell allows the viewer to change their perception of something that they know, or disallow them from making assumptions based on what knowledge they might have based on the name of the thing. Victor Shklovsky explores a literary device which has a similar effect in his essay Art as Device that he terms ‘defamiliarization’ (Shklovsky, 1991). The point of defamiliarization is not to obscure the name of a thing and force the reader to piece together what the writer means through clues, but to replace it entirely with more familiar imagery. The use of imagery in writing replaces the name of the thing or object with a new one. Most commonly this technique is used when the subject matter that the writing is describing is unfamiliar to the reader, instead then, the imagery that is used is familiar to the reader. The result of this is that the reader gains a new perspective on the object or experience, which allows them to become closer to the work.

Imagery is the key focus of the essay, Shklovsky begins by discussing what he means when he talks about imagery in relation to poetic and prosaic writings. This is largely through discussing the work of Potebnya. Imagery here means not to use pictures in the text, but to write in a way which brings the writing closer to our understanding through common experiences, even more common than those that the imagery is describing (p.1) as there are, of course, many things we read about that we have no real experience of. Furthermore, that as Potebnya’s conclusion is that “poetry equals imagery”, Shklovsky discusses that following it is then supposed that “imagery equals symbolism” (p. 3). This development is what is important, as the context of the image can change what it symbolises, as Shklovsky says, “This presupposes that an image is capable of serving as a constant predicate to a succession of changeable subjects” (p. 3). There is no power in the image itself, only in the context in which it is applied. If we apply this context, imagery, to naming, then we can see that the name of an object too, has no power, only that the word ‘bowl’, as an image, is capable of being used to describe an indeterminable spectrum of forms and that the word ‘bowl’ is rendered meaningless by itself. A bowl to two people is two different things, the use of this imagery is too board and non specific, it has been weakened through overuse. However if one writer were to write someone eating as a prospector, swilling their pan in search of gold and another as a person hollowing out half of a watermelon then it becomes clear how both of these images show how a person eating from a bowl can be transformed using more specific imagery to alter both the bowl’s shape and size and the manner in which the person eats, all without describing either. We know both images, so we use these to become closer that which is intended, without the need for overly detailed prose.

The most pertinent part of Shklovsky’s writing is when he comments on the almost peripheral grasping of an object in our day to day lives, how hard it is to use a pen or speak a second language for the first time, but how over time the challenge of the task melts away, invisibly.

Objects are grasped spatially, in the blink of an eye. We do not see them, we merely recognize them by their primary characteristics. The object passes before us, as if it  were prepackaged. We know that it exists because of its position in space, but we see only its surface. Gradually, under the influence of this generalizing perception, the object fades away (p. 5)

This is true not only in the physical world but, as Shklovsky is aware, in written works too. This is the purpose of defamiliarization. Bowl, at this point, to most readers forms such a faint facsimile of a form that it becomes nearly meaningless as an image. The word bowl is then detrimental to the quality of the experience. To alter the experience of the viewer enables them to understand what a writer means when they don’t use the name for something.

It seems that in our normal encounters with them, names entirely transform our experiences of things in an unintended manner, they can flavour our perceptions of things or provide us with a prejudice in some cases, but they also hide things. They allow the minutiae of our lives to remain hidden, enabling us to focus on other things, but this also results in us ignoring so much. We find ourselves incapable of living without names, but the very fact that we can’t live without them and must name everything alters the way we perceive everything irreversibly. But how has this happened? What is it about names that draws us to them? Naming is not a simple linguistic feature, but a more complicated mechanism that is simply able to be expressed through language. This is what the next chapter explores, names as things themselves, as memes.

Chapter 2

The Meme

This chapter explores not the implication of the name upon the thing, but the essence of names themselves, as things themselves worthy of discussion, as things of greater importance than a simple feature of human languages. By approaching names as memes rather than at their face value we can begin to understand the depth of their importance to our interactions.

Richard Dawkins’ seminal work on the passing on of genes and natural selection titled The Selfish Gene is largely focused on discussions of reproduction, competition and genetics. The book isn’t a scientific paper, but a discussion on theory and aimed at understanding through non-technical language. Chapter 11, Memes: The New Replicators is the most relevant to this dissertation. This chapter is about the ability for intangible ideas to be replicated through transmission between people, and popularised Dawkins’ invented term meme.

What is a name? In the most simple way, “A word or set of words by which a person or thing is known, addressed, or referred to.” (Oxford Living Dictionaries, 2019) This isn’t necessarily a description, though it can be, and often is. A laptop describes the fact that the computer is able to be used on one's lap, but doesn’t describe the object. A juicer or blender describes the task the object is intended to perform. This is the case with many objects, however often the description is obfuscated by a language barrier due to the etymological obliqueness of English. Telephone for example comes from the greek words tele meaning far off and phone meaning sound or voice (Online Etymological Dictionary, 2019), this becomes an almost poetic description for the object. Similarly a camera obscura is simply Latin for dark chamber (Online Etymological Dictionary, 2019), initially this is what large pinhole cameras were, a dark chamber with a hole in one wall, used famously by artists to draw accurately by tracing the image projected onto the wall opposite the hole. With modernisation we’ve shortened it to simply camera for our modern devices. Telephone too has been shortened, so now we often just use phone. Tele has been replaced in many uses, with phone often following mobile, cell, house or smart. These all denote differences in use, mobile and cell are British and American variations to suggest portability, house is used for a fixed phone in a house and smart is for phones that have extra features such as internet. This is where the descriptive nature of naming breaks, even when looked at etymologically. Mobile phone means movable sound (Online Etymological Dictionary, 2019), which sort of works, but could this not describe a portable speaker? Of course no description can be exclusive without being absurdly specific, however if we combine the examples of camera obscura and telephone we stumble into camera phones. In the early 2000s camera phones were being sold for the first time and were immensely popular before they were superseded by smartphones. However the name camera phone means room sound, this is nonsensical, of course the mixing of root languages isn’t an issue in modern English, but room sound doesn’t make anyone think of a camera phone. This is my point however, as a name doesn’t need to describe that which it refers to. A name isn’t a description at all, even if it is intended to be. A name is a concept, an idea, a meme. When using the words that describe something we don’t think of what it describes, even if it does so, we think of the learned cultural meaning of the word. A camera isn’t thought of as a chamber, but an object. Just as a blender is thought of as an object, not an action, this is shared among all who use it creating a common cultural interpretation of specific words.

If I am arguing that a name is in fact a meme, then of course we must explore what a meme is first. Dawkins begins by discussing the difference between man and other “survival machines” (Dawkins, 2006, p. 189) as he calls them, meaning any cell, plant, animal, human, or other life form. Dawkins proposes that ‘culture’ can sum up most of what differentiates us from other survival machines. He is clear in his use of the word culture in a scientific sense, not just meaning the arts. He raises language as a part of human culture, and points out how even though modern English is connected to that of Chaucer, they are not mutually intelligible. Each variation of English of course is used by the people who spoke it and they can communicate with both their children, parents, and further generations either way, but there comes a point past their death where they would no longer be understood. This, as Dawkins points out, is analogous to the mutation seen in genetics over generations that we call evolution. However Dawkins is quick to point out that this sort of cultural transmission is not exclusive to man, but is available in the non genetic transmission of songs in some birds, where new songs are created by erroneous repetition over generations. Humans are however where we can most easily study and experience cultural evolution. Of course even in humans language isn’t the limit, Dawkins examples include art and architecture, fashions in dress and diet, and technology.

Dawkins then discusses the ideas of ‘replicators’, such as the gene. The gene is the primary replicator of life on our planet, but surely any life that might exist off earth would have developed differently. It’s unlikely that their genetics are structured similarly to us at all, and so there could be other replicators. Dawkins is unhappy however to limit Darwinian theory to genes and the evolution of a species. He questions that there must be other replicators on our planet, why should we look so far away to off world replicators that we might never find? We can find a different sort of evolution right here. Dawkins names this replicator that is taking root in human culture a meme (p. 192). He says these memes are

Tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots or building arches. Just as genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperms or eggs so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation. (p.192)

In typical Dawkins fashion he discusses the god meme, one of the oldest memes, which has had so many unique permutations that variations of it are alive and competing among and between different groups of humans. As pointed out, the replication methods are obvious, it is spoken of, written about, present in art and in music, buildings are built around it, and lives and careers are focused towards it. However the real question is, why it is more successful than other memes? “What is it about the ideas of a god that gives it its stability and penetrance in the cultural environment?” (p.193) Psychological appeal is the obvious conclusion to Dawkins. It is comforting and provides a sort of answer to troubling questions of justice and mortality. The god meme is so prevalent due to its infective power in the environment of human culture. This contrasts with passive memes, like a recipe or fashion, which provide a more temporary comfort, rather than a life altering one, and so might not even last a year, let alone many lifetimes.

The measure of a meme’s success though is what Dawkins explores next. He breaks this success into three categories, longevity, fecundity and copying fidelity. Longevity is a slightly misleading category title here, it means each copy of a meme, not the meme in general. The second is fecundity, which is how rapidly a meme can replicate to other carriers, and copying fidelity is of course the accuracy of replication. If we take a joke, the longevity is short, jokes are forgotten often, but they have a high rate of fecundity, as you tell them to people who happily pass them on. Although, as we’ve all often encountered, jokes change and mutate with each teller. This contrasts with scientific theory, which are copied more accurately. That’s not to say they are without inaccuracies, but the rate is probably lower. However the rate of transmission would be much slower due to the size and complexity of the meme. Due to the importance that we often afford memes of this nature, it might be likely to last for a much longer time. Of course a meme’s ability to replicate itself means it has to compete with other memes, as pointed out by the author, this is obvious with some memes. The god meme encourages replication and longevity due to the punishments associated with not following it. Jokes are measured by their quality, and replicate accordingly in brains that view them as such. Other seemingly random memes are more difficult to explain. Why is hoover more popular than vacuum, or jacuzzi over hot tub? If iPad is the name that many uninformed people refer to their tablets, as is the case, is the meme replicated more successfully due to sheer exposure? Or is the success of a name meme something else? Brand names often become more successful than generic counterparts, but surely they would when the brand meme has the backing of advertisements strengthening the meme with a sense of style, class and quality.

Names are some of the most successful long lasting memes, my own name William has lasted hundreds of years, the rate of fecundity is high, but the accuracy has to a degree demonstrably faltered, as there are many permutations. William is not the original, but a mutation from Willahelm, an ancient German name. Willahelm was a descriptive name meaning resolute protector. (Behind the Name, 2018) Hardly fitting. This only scratches the surface, modern German still uses Willhelm, and other languages use Guillermo, Guillaume, Guglielmo, Gwilym (Behind the Name, 2018) or others. Each of these has unique journeys and has been inaccurately replicated to create unique but traceable memes, each now void of the original meaning. Other memes, like stories and songs are hidden, less surface level, more complex and with more hidden histories. Names are surface level memes, not thought of as anything important, remembered, but thought of as a tool for clarification rather than an idea. Names have thoroughly, stealthily become one of the most popular memes. Dawkins quotes a colleague, NK. Humphrey, who reviewed an early draft of his chapter and said

Memes should be regarded as living structures, not just metaphorically but technically. When you plant a fertile meme in my mind you literally parasitize my brain, turning it into a vehicle for the meme’s propagation in just the way that a virus may parasitize the genetic mechanism of a host cell. And this isn’t just a way of talking-the meme for, say, “belief in life after death” is actually realized physically, millions of times over, as a structure in the nervous systems of individual men the world over (Dawkins, 2006, p. 192)

What is a more successful meme than names? Only those memes now inseparable from the human experience; language, cooking, clothing. Names are pervasive, unavoidable, and render our day to day existence incomplete and almost unimaginable. These ‘primary memes’ as I would call them have evolved not only themselves, but by occupying us have created a host more willing to continue the propagation of the meme, creating not a parasite/host relationship, but a mutualistic symbiosis between the two counterparts. Susan Blackmore touches on this when discussing the origins of human language in The Meme Machine when she references Deacon likening “language to a personal symbiotic organism” (Blackmore, 1999, p. 98). Memes can be parasitic, they can be detrimental, as Dawkins explores (Dawkins, 2006, p. 198 - 199), the meme of celibacy is supported by a host of other religious memes, but cannot be passed on genetically for obvious reasons. This meme is detrimental to the ability of a human to replicate their genetics, but is helpful to other parasitic memes in passing on copies of themselves as it allows the carriers of the celibacy meme to spend more of their time focused on these other memes rather than on interpersonal relationships. Names are different, rather than hinder a person in interpersonal relationships, they actually provide an advantage. Think only how difficult it is to communicate with someone when you mishear, forget, or do not learn their name, likewise the frustration we experience when you fail to recall the name of an object that you talk of, in this way, the meme of names advances both itself and its host, creating an environment rich for replication. Names are not parasitic by nature, I would argue that it is unfair to call all memes parasites. Some are, but there are many mutualistic memes such as names and jokes, which both advance themselves and possibly the host’s social standing, however marginally. Memes are largely symbiotic by nature, with scope for multiple types of host/symbiont interaction.

When viewed in this context, it becomes clear how naming is so impactful. As words they are simple tools, labels that serve no purpose more than clarification and identification. When we take names as memes, we reveal a power within them. They grow from labels and become ideas, we pass these ideas on and they grow and morph over time, becoming important in their own right. However this raises an issue. If we refer to a thing with another thing, we can struggle to tell them apart. If these two things become so intertwined that we lose sight of their independent thingness, then we lose the ability to accurately assess our surroundings.

Chapter 3

The Thing

As discussed in the previous chapters, there is importance not only in things, but in what we call them too. In this chapter, we explore this in greater detail in relation to one simple object; Heidegger’s Jug. Heidegger seeks to understand the nature of things, using the jug only as an example. This chapter aims to examine how well we can understand this one thing, and from that all others, when it must be viewed through the lens of another thing of equal importance; the name of that thing.

In Poetry Language and Thought (Heidegger, 1971) Martin Heidegger discusses the nature of things, in particular a jug, and our perception of it. Heidegger’s text focuses initially on ‘nearness’ as he puts it. Nearness here translates to ‘understanding’. The initial passage is a lamentation at our desire to bring things ‘near’ to us, to attempt to understand them through proximity. His focus is now slightly dated, as his points on television would also be extremely well suited to the internet. Regardless, he talks of distance being removed by the television, but the nearness remaining unattainable. “Yet the frantic abolition of all distances brings no nearness; for nearness does not consist in shortness of distance.” (p. 193) Heidegger's suggestion is that our understanding of something does not improve by video or images of it being transmitted into our home. We have all seen countless pictures of monuments, on our countless screens, in an attempt to be nearer to them. Many of us too, have been fortunate enough to travel to famous places that we’ve seen images of before and appreciate the difference between the two.

To understand something takes more than a glance or even a detailed study of an image. Take a jigsaw as an example. To complete a jigsaw is to ponder for hours, examine the pieces, the construction and their colouration. Patterns are searched for and found, grouped in their colours and type. Each piece has been inspected closely, analysed, and matched with those that belong near it. Eventually the puzzle is solved and you know every detail of the image. The subject of the image is not yet known however. You see the image completed but what is near to you is the jigsaw. This you would understand clearly, if you cared to. The thoughts however, are focused on the image, the jigsaw often remains far due to the passive interaction of it. In the same way that we look at digital images on a screen, we look through a jigsaw, attempting to understand what it has printed on it. We pay little attention to a jigsaw, like we pay little attention to a screen. The end result is an unfulfilling farness. If the hours spent closely inspecting a jigsaw can’t convey any actuality of the representation, then how can a glance at an image, or a few panning shots in a documentary show us any understanding of the place? This is highlighted yet further when one returns from a place that they have visited, famous or not. Most people today have taken pictures of places they’ve been, and too most people have said something along the lines of “It’s not like it was when you’re really there” when showing images to a friend. I feel that this point of self imposed farness after knowing nearness is the most relatable way of explaining this feeling in our modern world. To see is not to understand, to experience is to begin to understand, and to analyse allows us to comprehend. This is true nearness, and this is what Heidegger does next with his example of a jug.

Heidegger breaks the jug down in order to understand it as an object. If by breaking it down and analysing the pieces in the same manner as the jigsaw, then by understanding the components and reassembling it, it can become near. To understand a thing is to know it intimately, and to know it intimately one must explore the depths of the thing. To see a jug is to see a vessel. This is simply a tool that holds and pours liquids. But to disassemble the jug into its component parts enriches our understanding of the thing. He explores the material, the ceramic nature of the jug which ties it to the earth, by being made from it. His next suggestion is that this ceramic does not make the jug. The ceramic is just a support. “The emptiness, the void, is what does the vessel’s holding, the empty space, this nothing of the jug, is what the jug is as the holding vessel.” (p. 167) The vessel is defined by its void. Without the nothingness within the vessel, the vessel would itself not be a vessel, and it would be nothingness. Nothingness is what we would assume is within the ‘void’ of the jug, however it is actually the purest essence of the vessel. Too, as Heidegger points out, science would say that it’s filled with transparent air. He then counters this, saying “But-is this reality the jug? No. Science always encounters what its kind of representation has admitted beforehand as an object possible for science.” (p. 168) Heidegger’s point here is that the air inside the jug does not help us to understand what the jug is or what it represents, so we cannot understand the nature of the object through a purely scientific approach, as for example an accurate analysis of the composition of the air and clay would help us little to understand the nature of the object.

Instead of using science, Heidegger launches into an extended exploration of the possible contents of a jug, the use of water and wine, the thirst quenching and god honouring abilities. Heidegger connects the water to the earth along which it flows, and the sky from which it falls, and the wine to the earth from which it grows and to the gods in the sky whose libations it fulfils. He summarises that this is fulfilled all at once, earth, sky, gods and mortals are all held within the void of the jug, gathering together to form the jug. Heidegger explains that the word thing comes from an Old German word meaning gathering (p. 172), this perspective, a thing as a gathering of things and not as isolated objects enables a rich view of every object that we encounter daily. To do this is to bring nearness, this nearness, as discussed earlier, is an understanding. Heidegger discusses more and more the thing, and less attempts a concrete understanding of what jug is. The jug serves only as an introduction, the thing is the focus. Through understanding that a ‘thing’ is a gathering, we can apply this to not just the jug, but to any object, and then approach them from the perspective of a person who understands that the jug is a ‘gathering’ of humans, gods, earth and sky. Heidegger’s explanation of the  nature of the jug being a gathering is confusingly explained, but his point is more simply conveyed by Bill Brown in his essay on Thing Theory, he describes things as the excessive parts of objects. The parts that exceed their materialisation or functional use as objects of utility. “The magic by which objects become values, fetishes, idols and totems.” (Brown, 2001, p.5)

However I would argue that the nature of the jug is still not fully understood. To use the word ‘jug’ when describing the jug is akin to looking at a completed jigsaw and trying to understand each piece. One would only attempt to understand the image that the jigsaw shows when completed. The jigsaw and the jug must both be deconstructed to be understood. The word jug prevents this, as the image on the jigsaw prevents the user from considering the jigsaw itself as an entity. The word jug here instead of helping us to understand the jug, could instead be thought of as a name for the gathering that comprises the jug. In this way it is like the image on a jigsaw. It doesn’t help us to understand each piece, but defines them in relation to each other. In this way the word jug becomes the clay, surrounding the void and defining the thingness. Jug then, becomes a specific gathering, as the physical description of the jug is worthless. Heidegger only describes a ceramic vessel made by a potter, with sides and a bottom. He describes something that holds wine and water. He describes a jug, a mug, an amphora, a flagon, a flask, a teapot, and even a chamber pot fits his vague description of a ceramic vessel with a handle. It doesn’t matter what you fill the vessel with, a chamber pot isn’t going to somehow reject wine. Each of these is made of the same physical things, but comprise of entirely different gatherings of things. Culturally, the jug is so ingrained that it is impossible for us to separate it from the gathering that it describes.

This creates a difficult situation where the jug is so concrete to us that the word jug cannot possibly be separated from the gathering within our minds, then, because of this we are less able to understand the gathering that it is made up of. I feel that the word jug, once a name for the gathering, becomes part of the gathering itself. If one reads the text knowing in advance that it is a jug that is being deconstructed then they become prejudiced towards it. If the word jug is withheld and the gathering moulded in the mind’s eye of the reader like the clay from which the thing made then surely as they construct it themselves they will understand the thing to a greater degree. Heidegger himself says

When and in what way do things appear as things? They do not appear by means of human making. But neither do they appear without the vigilance of mortals. The first step toward such vigilance is the step back from the thinking that merely represents - that is, explains - to the thinking that responds and recalls. (Heidegger, 1971, P. 179)

The step back, as he puts it, is to withhold the word jug, to be vigilant and think about the jug as a thing, not the thing as a jug. Here we return to the jigsaw that I discussed earlier. By removing the complete name, the jug initially loses form, but by understanding each piece, the picture is more solid in the mind of the viewer than it ever was before. Heidegger’s discussion of the composition of the jug is limited to the physical materials, the maker, and the cultural usage of the object. But is the name not another element of the structure of the jug?“Men alone, as mortals, by dwelling attain to the world as world. Only what conjoins itself out of world becomes a thing.” (p. 180) The conjoined nature of the thing and the name for the thing reveal the true thingness of the jug. The jug is made by humans, for humans, and named by humans. This gathering is a gathering of humans and human concerns. To approach the nature of the object without considering how we refer to, not only all objects, but each object is to be as worthless as to not consider them at all.

This chapter focuses on the thing, and reveals the complexity hidden within everything around us by showing how each thing does not exist in isolation, but as a gathering of other things, physical or non-physical. However it also shows that the complexity of these things is reliant on us being there to observe them and consider them. The next chapter aims not to remove the consideration of the thing, but by delaying it, discover how this changes the thing and people’s perception of it.

Chapter 4

The Propositional Object

Taking what has been discussed in the previous chapters and applying it to the world of art and design is the focus of this chapter. As shown, the name can serve as an initial impression of an object providing a prejudice and is hugely important in our perception of things. The name itself provides power over the object and over us, changing the very nature of the thing itself. The name becomes an integral part of the thingness of the thing. This chapter aims to highlight this by presenting a propositional object, created by the author of this dissertation, that interacts with names in a more obvious way. By bringing the name to the forefront of the experience the object will be more obviously interpretable and able to transition between any of the names that it is given. The propositional object will be a non functional form with no name and properties conducive to open ended interpretations.

The creation of an object is usually started with a need to fulfil a purpose. The object here however, is in a way intended to have no purpose. Its purpose is to be a canvas, to be able to be swayed by a name. If the purpose of the object is too well known or there is too much affordance that suggests a certain action it will not be convincingly renamed. The object should not have obvious handles, for example, as it denotes human use. Further to that, it is ideal that the object not have any connotations by the use of scale or material. In making the object, it becomes clear that the first hurdle is that of materiality, each material denotes uses or environments. A thing made from brushed aluminium would not make a good children's toy, in the same way that colourful plastic is considered less desirable in high end computers. The second hurdle is scale. A thing changes hugely when the scale is changed. Artists like Claes Oldenburg take advantage of both of these properties by changing the materials or scale of an object to alter our feelings towards it. A work like Pastry Case I (fig. 1) (Pastry Case, 1, 1928) shows familiar desert items represented as painted plaster sculptures. This creates a seemingly familiar artwork that provokes thought in the mind of the viewer. It’s clearly an artwork and non edible, but also very clearly a desert selection. This contradiction leaves us feeling none of the usual thoughts we would have to a desert selection, even though this recognisably is one. Contrasting this, to keep a  consistent sense of materiality, but change a sense of scale creates a similarly confusing outcome. Oldenburg and Coosje Van Bruggen created many artworks together which consist of gigantic versions of everyday objects. These dominate the landscapes that they occupy and feel alien compared to their counterparts. They remain easily recognisable but show the viewer a completely unknown view of the object in question. The beauty in those works, and in Pastry Case I is that the subjects are known, so they are immediately recognisable, instead of forcing the viewer to deconstruct the shape and search for something recognisable they instead allow the viewer to be immediately taken by the differences to their known counterparts.

We know then that to change the physical properties of an object means that it creates a different impression. But changing an object by changing its scale or material allows only the new impression and the old, already known one. Oldenburg's giant objects are not ‘new’, but modifications, they are new interpretations and experiences but only really viewable through the lens of the normal objects. This only serves to create two unique objects with little interpretation between them. To create an object with more transient readings we must create something with no purpose, materiality, or scale. If we create an object without these properties then we create a nameless form that is simultaneously able to be many things, and also none of them. Of course the simplest way to make this object is through the use of digital technology. A physical object has to have a scale and a material, but in a digital space these are defined by the computer and are essentially meaningless. They are immediately changeable and only really serve as reference points for the possibility of replicating the digital representation in the real world.

Utilizing digital technology it is then possible to create a propositional object with no physical form such as this (fig. 2). The object here is rendered in black for clarity. The shape has six faces, each of which is curved towards the centre of the shape, with the large faces forming shallow bowl areas and the sides curving only along one axis. In this state it exists only as an expression of digital parameters. It has no name, no context, physical form, scale or material. The object says nothing to us that might be used to interpret it. So what is the value in this non object, this formless form?

By viewing this object in a digital world, we realise that we are not only free to project onto the object, but that for it to have any meaning at all, we must do so. Instead of believing that it speaks to us, we are able to embrace our own interpretations. I refer back to Knell’s comments referenced in chapter one where he says “while art historians believed the object was communicating to them they were really talking to it, infusing it with their thoughts and desires.” (Knell, 2012, p. 324) Knell raised this as a criticism, but it is the point of this object. The object appears blank, but by naming it you summon gatherings towards it from within yourself. The name becomes a conduit for the thingness of the thing. When the object receives a name, it does not only receive a name, but a scale, a material and a context. In the same way that Heidegger discusses a simple ceramic vessel with a handle but gathers it together with the name jug (Heidegger, 1971, p. 167), this object can be gathered with many names. If this object is named as a fruit bowl (fig. 3) then it immediately changes. It becomes a feature made of wood sat upon a table and gains a defined purpose. Fruit nestles inside its gentle curve. If it were instead to be a chopstick rest then it changes completely. The object now sits upended, a small ceramic piece with a glossy glaze. It has blended into the environment it now inhabits, no longer the focal point, but an element of the tableware.

These small functional uses are only the most basic interpretations for the object. The object can be called a building and realised as the one shown here (fig. 4). This interpretation entirely changes the nature of the object, it is no longer a unified whole but an amalgam of metal, glass, concrete and steel. The object becomes reliant on component parts. Conversely, the object in question can become a component part in a building. When used as part of the foundational structure for a building it increases the building’s resistance to earthquakes. This component part of a concave sliding base isolation unit. The object sits between two domes, one end firmly in the ground and the other as a main load bearing column in the building. When the ground shakes, the object allows the building to slide in any direction and return the the centre point. The diagram (fig. 5), simplified for clarity, shows how this would work. The base of the building is at ground level, with the concave sliding base isolation units in more enclosed surrounds at a sub ground level, with the foundations below. When positioned, these are able to be disguised as pillars with rubber seals at points of movement to minimise degradation and visual impact.

The name is powerful, these few examples only begin to show the variety of uses and experiences that new names can provide a thing. This form is boundlessly interpretable, limited only by the mind of the interpreter. However in the same way that Oldenburg and van Bruggen‘s works create new objects, this does the same. Each interpretation here is in a way, final. Once named, these become what the name expects of them, the decisive naming of the object removes the ability to fully explore the form. They cease to be interpretations of the same form and become new named objects that share a similar shape. The name once again limits the perception of the thing, by showing that the removal of the name is freeing, we also show that the addition of a name is limiting. Once defined, the redefinition becomes much much harder. The propositional object is best approached as a mental exercise to encourage us to strive to think how many more uses can be thought of for this one object, and for each other object that we make or encounter. Can we remove the name from other forms, then successfully repurpose them in new ways, scales and materials without simply making ornaments or artworks? Truly, the intention of the propositional object is to embolden the viewer to break through the limitations that names provide us and reinterpret the world full of around them.

In this chapter we see how the creation of an object with no name enables it to become any interpretation. This chapter discovers the level to which we see the name being key in defining the physical features of an object and our relations too it. The very same form is realised in scales and materials so drastically different from each other as to be unthinkable if not for the familiar shape.

Conclusion

The Gathering

This dissertation has discussed the many facets of names and possible implications of naming things. To begin. the dissertation explores whether names for people can impact their lives. This is explored through comedy initially, as people find unorthodox or familiar sounding foreign names enjoyable. Names are also a point of importance to a lot of people when they consider how to name children.

The first chapter develops this by exploring non-human names. The implications of names change when they stop being used to directly refer to one another. Here in exploring the German names for Shrews and Bats we reveal how the names of animals is a possible factor in how we treat them. By naming non-pests as pets we potentially encourage people to treat them as such. (Ohl, 2019 p. 13) This relates not just to animals however, as all objects too are based on their name, we use the name in parallel to the physical surface of an object as a para-surface and judge it based on the name. Surfaces are often all we see of objects, and para-surfaces are all too often how we exclusively refer to objects. Without delving deeper into the properties of the object we limit ourselves to the superficial aspects.

We then explore, with the aid of Knell, the complete removal of the name (Knell, 2012, p. 330) we understand the degree to which it is relied upon, by not naming the object of his discussion we’re shown how much we would have relied upon preconceptions, but are now forced to rely on Knell’s writing instead. Shklovsky then develops this by not removing the name, but replacing it. While the essay Art as Device (Shklovsky, 1991, p. 3) has a literary focus, the essay reveals the use of names as imagery in place of experience. Embracing this, we realise that the name provides an object, and a preconception, it doesn’t provide an experience, but a prepackaged expectation, and that replacing the weak common image, the name, with a more thoughtful image of a specific experience, we can create stronger writing. This can then be applied to non literary fields as well, as we explore later.

In the second chapter we explore names as memes. This exploration revolves around Dawkins’ initial creation of the term in The Selfish Gene (Dawkins, 2006, p. 192) and how this can apply to names. We begin by exploring the nature of names again, but this time not as labels for humans but as descriptive words that refer to objects. These descriptive names often iterate and lose their meaning, showing that we essentially refer to objects with invented terms that no longer describe them.

This discussion is then brought back to humans and the names they bear as we look at how these names sometimes began as descriptors of admirable qualities, but then through transference across languages these meanings were lost while new spellings and pronunciations were gained. This is similar to object names losing meaning as they iterate. It doesn’t make the name less effective, just more removed from the original intention. The name evolves through imperfect replication as memes do.

The issue of memes being parasitic is one of Dawkins’ main points. He argues that we act as hosts, manipulated for their gain, but the name disagrees with this. By embracing memes we further both the meme and ourselves. Jokes are a key example, we further the meme the more we tell it, but we also further ourselves as people will want to speak to us if we tell good jokes. Names work similarly, we further ourselves with memorable names, and by simply using them we allow communication with us to be easier. In this way they become symbiotic rather than parasitic, as each furthers the other while also furthering itself.

Consulting Heidegger in the third chapter we explore the nature of the thing and the name in relation to that. In The Thing (Heidegger, 1971, p. 168) Heidegger deconstructs things to enable us to interpret them as more than simple objects. His focus is on the jug and how it is not a mere ceramic vessel but a complicated assemblage of the non physical elements that form our cultural interpretation of the jug, this is what he terms a gathering. However unpacking this more, the dissertation explores the impact of the name on the gathering of the thing. As the name serves as an image for the thing, then with the name comes its own interpretations and connotations which alter the way we think of it. This is why similar objects such as two vessels could be seen to have such different gatherings, as the name we give each one is instrumental in the gathering of the thing.

When we interpret an object without acknowledging the importance of the name, our understanding of the gathering is hindered, as we struggle to see how much of the gathering is informed by the name. The name is not simply applied to the gathering of things as a label, but  is a component in the gathering itself. Heidegger cannot then remove the name of the jug if he wishes to explain it as being a gathering of things, as to remove the name as Knell (Knell, 2012, p. 330) does would severely limit his ability to explain the particular set of things that form the jug. However he does not draw attention to the name being a part of the gathering.

To emphasise the name as part of the gathering of the thing the author created a propositional object with no thingness and no name. This object was created digitally to remove scale, material and physical context. Various names were then provided to this digital form, such as fruit bowl and concave sliding base isolation unit to summon materials to them. Each of these things is then shown as computer renders or composite images with a sense of scale, and in materials that fit the use. It is in this way that the name gathers the thingness to the thing. With each new name a new gathering is summoned.

This thought experiment shows that the name being removed provides forms with nearly limitless applications, but also how once each gathering is complete, the name again limits each new interpretation. The new name provides a finality that the object was created not to have. The name has the power to imbue the object with so much, but simultaneously prevents anything but itself having the same power to do so.

This object makes us return to the statement posed by Train at the start of this dissertation, “A dull name can mean a dull child.” (Train, 1977, p. 11) While this might not always be true in the case of people, the propositional object suggests the opposite might be true for things. Names have been shown throughout this dissertation to have huge impact on the way we interpret things. Indeed, the name can change the very nature of the thing itself, and a dull name could very well mean a dull thing. The name is not unimportant, but hiding, misunderstood and unquestioned, like many memes and things. We fail to see those most close to us, misunderstanding their intentions and interactions. To label names as simple tools is to deny them the hidden complexity that they possess. Appearing superficial and unimportant, but like many things that should not be judged at a glance, names prove to possess great depths of complexity. To name is to define, to become unchangeable, and fully enter the human world as a gathering, and as a thing. For what thing has no name?


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Figures

  • Fig 1 p. 23 - Oldenburg, C (1961-62) Pastry Case, I [Mixed Media] Available at MoMA Online: https://www.moma.org/collection/works/81721 [Accessed 18/01/19]

  • Fig 2 p. 25 - Author’s own (11/01/18) Indeterminate Object

  • Fig 3 p. 26 - Author’s own [Composite] (30/11/18) Fruit Bowl

    • Jones, S (2015) Seamless Wood Texture [Digital Image] Available at: https://sivioco.com/blog/how-to-create-a-seamless-wood-texture-in-photoshop/ [Accessed 25/11/18]

  • Fig 4 p. 27 - Author’s own [Composite] (03/12/18) Building

    • Sketchup Texture club (2019) Glass building skyscraper texture seamless 00949 [Online] Available at: https://www.sketchuptextureclub.com/textures/architecture/buildings/skycrapers/glass-building-skyscraper-texture-seamless-00949 [Accessed 01/12/18]

    • Google Maps (2019) 51°28’46”N 3°11’08”W [Online] Available at: https://www.google.com/maps/@51.4758056,-3.1713687,275a,35y,282.54h,64.92t/data=!3m1!1e3 [Accessed 30/11/18]

Fig 5 p. 28 - Author’s own (15/01/19) Concave Sliding Base Isolation Unit